Mere exposure effect : a consequence of direct and indirect fluency-preference links by Willems, Sylvie & Van der Linden, Martial
Consciousnesswww.elsevier.com/locate/concog
Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341
and
CognitionMere exposure eﬀect: A consequence of direct and indirect
ﬂuency–preference links q
Sylvie Willems a,*, Martial Van der Linden a,b
a University of Lie`ge, Belgium
b University of Geneva, Switzerland
Received 10 February 2005
Available online 22 September 2005Abstract
In three experiments, picture quality between test items was manipulated to examine whether subjects
expectations about the ﬂuency normally associated with these diﬀerent stimuli might inﬂuence the eﬀects
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Conversely, obvious, and noticed, diﬀerences in test picture quality did no aﬀect responses, suggesting that
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Repeated exposure to an initially neutral and unfamiliar stimulus, without any reinforcement,
results in more favorable aﬀective judgment, a phenomenon known as the mere exposure eﬀect
(Zajonc, 1968). Experiments involving a wide range of stimuli (e.g., Chinese ideographs, Turkish
words, line drawings, faces, possible and impossible three-dimensional objects, and melodies), and
procedures (from forced-choice preference judgments to likeability ratings, pleasantness ratings,
behavioral indices of stimulus preference, and self-reports of mood) have shown that people fre-
quently prefer stimuli they have seen before over novel stimuli (see Bornstein, 1989; Harrison,
1977, for reviews).
Several researchers suggested that enhanced processing ﬂuency due to a previous encounter may
serve as a basis for preference and produce the mere exposure eﬀect (e.g., Bornstein & DAgostino,
1994; Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989; Seamon, Brody, & Kauﬀ, 1983a, Seamon, Brody, & Kauﬀ,
1983b; Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea & Price, 2001). Enhanced processing ﬂuency can be deﬁned as
the ease with which information can be processed (as reﬂected by the speed and ease with which a
stimulus is perceived), either at a perceptual level (i.e., subsequent to a perceptual encoding pro-
cess involving that stimulus: perceptual ﬂuency) or at a conceptual level (i.e., subsequent to a con-
ceptual process involving information related to that stimulus: conceptual ﬂuency). If processing
ﬂuency due to a prior encounter is central to the mere exposure eﬀect, Schwartz, Reber, Winki-
elman and collaborators (e.g., Reber & Schwarz, 2001; Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 2004;
Schwarz, 2004a; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003) assume that any other vari-
ables that facilitate ﬂuent processing should similarly increase preference, even without pre-expo-
sure. In agreement with this assumption, several studies have shown that a host of variables—such
as ﬁgure-ground contrast, clarity with which a stimulus is presented, symmetry, presentation
duration, presentation of a subliminal prime just before the stimulus, etc.—inﬂuence the ease
of processes as well as preference judgments (e.g., Reber et al., 2004, for a review). Finally, recent
research has shown that repeated pre-exposure, as well as other ﬂuency manipulations (e.g., pre-
sentation of a subliminal prime just before the stimulus, variations in presentation duration), does
not aﬀect only explicit preference judgments but also elicits psychophysiological responses (Har-
mon Jones & Allen, 2001; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001) like positive aﬀective responses over the
region of the zygomaticus major (‘‘smiling muscle’’) as measured by facial electromyography
(EMG; e.g., Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986). Consequently, in the case of mere exposure
eﬀect paradigms, preference most probably results from processing ﬂuency due to repeated pre-
exposure. However, the latter is not central per se for preference judgment. Rather, any variable
that increases processing ﬂuency could elicit spontaneous aﬀective reactions, which, in turn, could
serve as relevant input for perceivers explicit preference judgment (e.g., Reber et al., 2004; Sch-
warz, 2004a; Winkielman et al., 2003).
Furthermore, although this link between ﬂuency and preference has been well established, and
even though the mere exposure eﬀect has proven to be a reliable phenomenon, the inﬂuence of
ﬂuency on explicit preference judgment is not always observed and seems to depend on several
experimental conditions (e.g., see Bornstein, 1989, for some boundary conditions). For example,
it has been observed that pre-exposure has the strongest inﬂuence on explicit preference when
stimuli are presented during encoding for relatively short durations (e.g., Bornstein & DAgostino,
1992), with low pre-exposure frequency (e.g., Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998), or when the stimuli
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people sometimes prefer novel to familiar stimuli (Fenske, Raymond, & Kunar, 2004), complex
rather than simple ﬁgures (Berlyne & Crozier, 1971), and so on. These observations may reﬂect
the intermediation of additional indirect factors such as attribution, expectation, and relevance
evaluation between automatic positive aﬀect due to processing ﬂuency and explicit preference re-
sponse (see Reber et al., 2004; Winkielman et al., 2003).
The literature on ﬂuency as a cue to familiarity-based recognition may shed some light on these
additional indirect factors. According to the ﬂuency/attribution account (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby,
1998), familiarity is explained in terms of unconscious attribution of stimulus ﬂuency to the eﬀect
of a prior experience; the stimulus is then consciously experienced as familiar. However, ﬂuency as
a cue to familiarity does not operate as a simple equation ‘‘ﬂuent stimulus equals old stimulus’’
(e.g., Whittlesea, 2003). On the contrary, the relationship between the feeling of familiarity and
ﬂuency seems to be indirect, mediated by unconscious attributional processes (Jacoby & Dallas,
1981; Jacoby et al., 1989). For example, Kelley and Rhodes (2002) suggest that when an irrelevant
source of ﬂuency (e.g., the presentation of an obvious supraliminal prime just before the stimulus)
is noticed and appreciated by the subject, high-processing ﬂuency may be perceived as uninforma-
tive and may be entirely attributed to this irrelevant source (i.e., to the prime at the test time and
not to a previous encounter); accordingly, it will not give rise to a feeling of familiarity. Further, a
recent series of works by Whittlesea and colleagues (Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea & Wil-
liams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; see also Lloyd, Westerman, & Miller, 2003; Westerman, Lloyd, &
Miller, 2002) provide evidence that these attributional processes are quite sophisticated. Accord-
ing to their discrepancy-attribution hypothesis, enhanced ﬂuency is attributed to prior exposure to
a stimulus, and creates a feeling of familiarity, only when the individual is surprised by the ease
with which he or she is able to process the item. In other words, their hypothesis states that an
individual interprets ﬂuency as a sign of previous encounter if the actual ﬂuency he or she per-
ceives for the stimulus is greater than the ﬂuency that would normally be expected from that type
of stimulus. Thus, seeing a student in class does not generate a striking feeling of familiarity,
whereas seeing the same student at the supermarket does.
In the same vein, some authors have suggested that, once aﬀective experience is elicited by a
ﬂuent processing, its impact on preference judgments may be moderated by indirect attributional
processes (e.g., Bornstein & DAgostino, 1994; Butler, Berry, & Helman, 2004; Reber et al., 2004;
Schwarz, 2004a; Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998; Winkielman & Fazendeiro, 2003, cited by Reber
et al., 2004). Butler et al. (2004) recently obtained a mere exposure eﬀect for nonwords but not for
words. These authors proposed that, in the case of real words, participants may expect to be able
to process such stimuli eﬃciently. As such, the enhanced ﬂuency associated with recently present-
ed words is unsurprising and is not attributed to preference. Conversely, enhanced ﬂuency for
nonwords may be more surprising and capture subjects attention; this increases the likelihood
that ﬂuency will serve as the basis for preference decisions. However, another possibility suggested
by these authors is that preferences for words may already be fully established before the start of
the experiment and therefore it is unlikely to have been changed by a single experimental expo-
sure. Further, Winkielman and Fazendeiro gathered more direct evidence for attributional pro-
cesses contribution by demonstrating that the inﬂuence of ﬂuency on liking judgments is
eliminated when subjects attribute their ﬁrst aﬀective reaction to an external and irrelevant
variable, such as background music.
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some ﬂuently processed stimuli may continue to elicit an explicit preference, such as after an obvi-
ous supraliminal presentation phase, of the kind that has been used in some mere exposure par-
adigms (e.g., Seamon et al., 1995, 1997). Consequently, the nature of the connection between ease
of processing and explicit preference judgments and the importance of additional indirect factors
such as expectations and attributions of perceived ﬂuency seem to be complex. The role of such
indirect factors in the ﬂuency–preference link has not received much attention (see Winkielman
et al., 2003); nevertheless, their investigation could help us to understand the mere exposure eﬀect.
The ﬁrst question addressed by this study was whether the impact on explicit preference judg-
ments of enhanced ﬂuency due to pre-exposure (i.e., the mere exposure eﬀect) may be modulated
by subjects expectations about the ﬂuency feeling during their judgment (Butler et al., 2004; Re-
ber et al., 2004). For example, subjects expectations could be manipulated by diﬀerent levels of
picture quality during the preference judgment. Indeed, people most probably expect greater ﬂu-
ency for pictures that are presented with a high level of picture quality than for lower-quality pic-
tures. We assumed that subjects expectations due to picture quality could have two potential
inﬂuences (Schwarz, 2004a, 2004b). First, an unexpected ﬂuency feeling (e.g., ﬂuency due to
pre-exposure for a low-quality stimulus) might be more salient and might be more likely to be
used for preference judgments. Second, if a variable (e.g., a stimulus presented with a high picture
quality) allows participants to formulate expectations about the feeling of ﬂuency, this feeling
might be attributed mainly to this variable. In this case, there are two options: either this variable
is perceived as relevant (e.g., an objective characteristic of the object itself, such as its symmetry),
and the positive aﬀect related to perceived ﬂuency is considered as an useful cue to preference
judgment. Alternatively, this variable might be perceived as incidental and irrelevant (e.g., picture
quality, or any other variable that is not inherent in the object itself), and thus the resulting
positive aﬀect related to ﬂuency is evaluated as uninformative and subjects might turn to inputs
other than ﬂuency to form a preference judgment (e.g., Bornstein & DAgostino, 1994; Schwarz,
2004a, 2004b; Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998).
The second question addressed was whether the potential inﬂuence of subjects expectations on
the mere exposure eﬀect depended on subjects awareness of the diﬀerent levels of picture quality.
We assumed that the ﬂuency feeling that derives from picture quality might have three potential
impacts. First, an imperceptible variation in quality should simply have a direct and independent
impact on the preference judgment. Indeed, with an imperceptible diﬀerence in quality, partici-
pants will probably not construct expectations concerning the ease of processing high- and
low-quality stimuli. Consequently, the absolute amount of processing ﬂuency (i.e., due to both
pre-exposure and picture quality eﬀects) should inﬂuence their judgment. Similar results for famil-
iarity have often been observed by using an imperceptible factor to enhance ﬂuency for a portion
of the test items (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; Lloyd et al., 2003; Westerman, 2001). Second,
a more perceptible but still small quality diﬀerence might allow participants to expect to be able to
process stimuli more or less eﬃciently. So, as described above, an unexpected feeling of ﬂuency
(such as enhanced ﬂuency for recently presented low-quality stimuli) should elicit an explicit pref-
erence. Conversely, the inﬂuence of ﬂuency feelings associated with high-quality stimuli should be
reduced, because this ﬂuency should be less surprising and thus should be attributed mainly to
picture quality. Finally, a more obvious and noticeable quality diﬀerence could allow subjects
to allocate more resources to accurately assess the ﬂuency resulting from picture quality by
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ity. Thus, the mere exposure eﬀect size should not be inﬂuenced by a too obvious diﬀerence in
picture quality between stimuli, or at any rate, it should be less so.
To examine whether the inﬂuence of indirect factors could be generalized and applied to other
feelings that depend on processing ﬂuency, the third goal of this study was to compare the impact
of these indirect factors on the mere exposure eﬀect, on one hand, and on the feeling of familiarity
in a recognition task, on the other hand. To explore these questions, we investigated the mere
exposure eﬀect and familiarity-based recognition by creating test conditions where ﬂuency was
modulated for target items during the test phase. To this end, we presented unfamiliar three-di-
mensional objects in the study phase with incidental encoding. Then, we investigated the inﬂuence
of various picture qualities by manipulating the degree of ﬁgure-ground contrast for targets and/
or distractors during forced-choice preference and recognition judgments. In addition, a Remem-
ber–Know–Guess (RKG) procedure was applied to the recognition task.
The reasons for these methodological choices were as follows. First, Seamon et al. (1995,
1997) have shown a signiﬁcant mere exposure eﬀect by using the same kind of unfamiliar
three-dimensional objects with supraliminal presentation and incidental encoding. In addition,
it has been shown that pictures with a high ﬁgure-ground contrast are perceived as clearer and
easier to process than low-contrast ones (Checkosky & Whitlock, 1973; Whittlesea, Jacoby, &
Girard, 1990). Moreover, studies have shown that preference judgments about simple circles
are inﬂuenced by ﬂuency due to variation in ﬁgure-ground contrast (Reber & Schwarz, 2001;
Reber, Winkielman, & Schwarz, 1998). However, this inﬂuence could diﬀer depending on the
kind of ﬁgure to be processed. Indeed, while picture quality may be judged pertinent by sub-
jects for their preference judgments of relatively simple ﬁgures (such as circles; Reber & Sch-
warz, 2001; Reber et al., 1998), it may be perceived as non-essential and incidental for
complex three-dimensional objects. Indeed, this material is inherently rich in visual features
that subjects should perceive as more essential to their preference judgments than picture qual-
ity. In addition, the extent of ﬁgure-ground contrast can easily be manipulated. Thus, we can
compare the inﬂuence of contrast between targets and/or distractors with imperceptible (10%,
Experiment 1), subtle (20%, Experiment 2), or obvious (40%, Experiment 3) manipulations.
Fourth, the forced-choice procedure allows one to manipulate the subjects expectation of a ﬂu-
ency advantage or disadvantage for the target by direct comparison with the distractor. For
example, with a distractor with a low-contrast level, the ﬂuency advantage for the target might
be more expected when the target is presented with a higher level of contrast than with the
same low level. Conversely, a ﬂuency advantage for the target might be more surprising if
the target is presented with a lower contrast level than the distractor. Fifth, we used the
Remember–Know–Guess recognition procedure (RKG; Gardiner, 1988; Tulving, 1985) in order
to characterize the processes involved in recognition performance. The procedure requires sub-
jects to report their states of awareness accompanying the act of retrieval. If they can recollect
some discriminating details of the item itself or of the learning context, they make a Remember
(R) response (recollection process). If the participants simply have a feeling of familiarity, in
the absence of any detailed recollection, they make a Know (K) response. Finally, if they are
unsure about their response, they make a Guess (G) response. Past research has shown that
processing ﬂuency can mediate successful K responses, but not R recognition (e.g., Rajaram,
1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000).
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In this ﬁrst experiment, we examined cases in which processing ﬂuency is enhanced by pre-ex-
posure and additionally manipulated by imperceptible ﬁgure-ground contrast variations at the
time of preference and recognition judgments. We assumed that enhancing or decreasing ﬂuency
by imperceptible manipulations of the ﬁgure-ground contrast could have a direct impact on the
mere exposure eﬀect and on familiarity-based recognition. More speciﬁcally, for the test phase,
we prepared four types of target–distractor pairs by combining low- or high-contrast distractors
(Distractor/+) and low- or high-contrast targets (Target/+). In terms of absolute ﬂuency
advantage for targets, Distractor/Target+ pairs should be superior to Distractor/Target
and Distractor+/Target+ pairs, which themselves should be superior to Distractor+/Target
pairs. Indeed, for Distractor/Target+ pairs, there is a facilitation of processing only for the
target due to pre-exposure and high contrast at the time of testing. Conversely, for
Distractor+/Target pairs, there is a facilitation of target processing due to pre-exposure;
however, the distractor is also made easier to process when it has a higher contrast than the target.
Finally, for Distractor/Target and Distractor+/Target+, target and distractor did not diﬀer in
contrast; only pre-exposure could enhance target ﬂuency.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
Fourteen undergraduate students were volunteers in this experiment. There were six men and
eight women. Their mean age was 20.2 years (SD = 1.3).
2.1.2. Materials and procedure
Forty-eight line drawings of unfamiliar three-dimensional objects were used (Williams & Tarr,
1997). In a preliminary phase, we prepared two sets of equally complex ﬁgures (see Carrasco &
Seamon, 1996). First, each ﬁgure was rated by 30 undergraduate students on a 5-point Likert scale
of ‘‘subjective complexity.’’ Then, angles, elements, lines, and segments were counted for each ﬁg-
ure. Figures were assigned to Sets A and B so that they would be equal on all these variables
(ps > .05). Half of the subjects were presented with Set A as targets and Set B as distractors.
The other half of the subjects were presented with the reverse design. Thus, the target and distrac-
tor sets did not diﬀer with regard to the objective and subjective complexity measures.
We created two versions of each ﬁgure: high-contrast (white on black) and low-contrast (the
picture underwent a 10% contrast reduction). This contrast reduction was very slight; thus, sub-
jects should not perceive the decrease in contrast quality. High-contrast versions were used for
study lists. For the test phase, we prepared 24 equally complex pairs of target–distractor ﬁgures:
6 Target+/Distractor, 6 Target/Distractor, 6 Target+/Distractor+, and 6 Target/Distrac-
tor+ pairs. Stimuli that were assigned to these four contrast conditions were randomly counter-
balanced between subjects.
To verify the extent to which the 10% contrast reduction is or is not perceptible by subjects, we
obtained judgments of contrast perception online from 10 additional subjects. More speciﬁcally,
these 10 subjects were asked to rate the pairs that were used in Experiment 1 on a 4-point Likert
scale that assessed conscious ‘‘contrast diﬀerence’’ perception (1: I dont see contrast diﬀerence
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I see a slight diﬀerence between the two ﬁgures; 4. I see a very clear diﬀerence between the two
ﬁgures). In addition, subjects were asked to choose the most contrasted stimulus within each pair;
even if they did not see any diﬀerence between the two stimuli.
The results showed that there is practically no conscious ‘‘contrast diﬀerence’’ perception. More
precisely, for pairs composed of distinct contrast stimuli, of the 120 responses, 88 responses were
of type ‘‘1’’ (‘‘I dont see contrast diﬀerence’’); 22 responses ‘‘2’’ (‘‘I have a vague feeling of
contrast diﬀerence’’), and 10 responses ‘‘3’’ (‘‘I see a slight diﬀerence’’). The mean of contrast
perception on the 4-point Likert was thus only 1.35 (SD = .57). More importantly, identical
results were obtained for the pairs composed of stimuli with same contrast. Indeed, the mean
of contrast perception estimation on the 4-point Likert for these pairs was 1.3 (SD = .56). Thus,
the ‘‘contrast diﬀerence’’ perception estimation did not diﬀer between pairs composed of same
contrast stimuli and pairs composed of distinct contrast stimuli (t (9) < 1). Second, for the pairs
composed of distinct contrast stimuli, subjects correctly chose the most contrasted stimulus in
54% of the trials, which was only marginally above chance (t (9) = 1.581, p < .1, d = .50).
However, these few correct responses did not diﬀer from incorrect responses as regards ‘‘contrast
diﬀerence’’ perception estimation (respectively, correct responses—M = 1.43, SD = .44; incorrect
responses—M = 1.48, SD = .68; t (9) < 1).
The material was presented using E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc.) on a
17 in. color monitor running at 60 Hz, approximately 70 cm from the subject. Figures were about
6 cm in height and 6 cm in width.
2.1.3. Incident study phase
Participants were told that the study involved ‘‘object perception,’’ and that they were going to
see 72 ﬁgures. After viewing three examples, they were asked to estimate the orientation for each
ﬁgure appearing on the screen (left or right). This task ensures that the subject stays focused
throughout the presentation and that global perceptual encoding takes place (inducing structural
processing of three-dimensional objects; Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney, 1990). No mention was
made of any subsequent memory test.
Subjects were then shown 24 white-on-black ﬁgures, three times each, in three random orders of
24. Each study stimulus was presented at the center of the screen for 2500 ms, followed by a
3500 ms interval (see Seamon et al., 1995, 1997, for a similar procedure).
2.1.4. Forced-choice preference judgment
Subjects were randomly presented with the 24 target–distractor pairs. Both ﬁgures were pre-
sented simultaneously to the subject for 1500 ms followed by a self-spaced interstimulus interval.
This relatively short duration was used to encourage reliance on ﬂuency of processing (e.g., Reber
& Schwarz, 2001). The side of the screen in which the target stimulus was displayed was random-
ized over trials. Subjects were asked to examine each pair and to choose the geometric shape they
liked best.
2.1.5. Forced-choice recognition judgment
The same pairs were displayed as in the preference task. Subjects were asked to point to the
shape that they had seen during the exposure phase. The procedure was identical to the preference
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explaining RKG responses were given to participants (see Appendix A). Participants entered their
recognition responses on the computer keyboard and made the RKG judgments orally.
Half of the subjects were presented with the preference judgment in ﬁrst position and the
recognition judgment afterwards. The other half of the subjects were presented with the reverse
design. The participants were tested individually.
2.2. Results and discussion
The mean proportion of target objects selected in the recognition and preference tasks as a
function of the four contrast conditions is presented in Table 1. As there was no eﬀect of the order
of the tasks on preference and recognition scores (ps > .1), we did not consider this variable in the
following analyses. This might appear surprising. Indeed, the ﬁrst test provides exposure to the
distractors, which should increase their ﬂuency. However, the targets were also presented during
the ﬁrst test. So, even if the ﬁrst test had increased distractors ﬂuency, it should also have in-
creased targets ﬂuency, thus leaving the ﬂuency diﬀerence between targets and distractors un-
changed between the ﬁrst and the second test.
2.2.1. Mere exposure eﬀect
We observed a signiﬁcant mere exposure eﬀect (subjects selected the previously seen ﬁgures in a
proportion greater than chance, estimated at .50), with medium-sized eﬀects for Target/Distrac-
tor (t (13) = 1.873, one-tailed, p < .05, d = .50), and for Target+/Distractor+ (t (13) = 1.803,
p < .05, d = .48), and a large eﬀect for Target+/Distractor (t (13) = 3.426, p < .005, d = .92).
The three conditions showing a signiﬁcant mere exposure eﬀect were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(p > .1). However, as expected, we observed a particularly large preference eﬀect size for pairs with
a facilitation of processing only for targets due to both pre-exposure and high contrast at test
(Target+/Distractor pairs). Indeed, Cohen (1988) deﬁned eﬀect sizes as ‘‘small, d = .2,’’ ‘‘medi-
um, d = .5,’’ and ‘‘large, d = .8.’’ Moreover, we observed no signiﬁcant mere exposure eﬀect forTable 1
Means as a function of the four contrast conditions for Experiments 1, 2, and 3
Tasks Distractors  Distractors +
Targets  Targets + Targets  Targets +
Experiment 1: 10% of contrast diﬀerence
Preference .61 (.23) .70 (.22) .49 (.28) .60 (.21)
Recognition .61 (.22) .77 (.22) .59 (.24) .61 (.23)
Experiment 2: 20% of contrast diﬀerence
Preference .66 (.18) .52 (.21) .63 (.26) .57 (.25)
Recognition .62 (.25) .79 (.18) .65 (.26) .59 (.27)
Experiment 3: 40% of contrast diﬀerence
Preference .60 (.20) .60 (.18) .64 (.25) .61 (.24)
Recognition .60 (.26) .80 (.15) .64 (.22) .60 (.34)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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the target (Target/Distractor+ pairs, t (13) = 0.191, p > .1).
2.2.2. Recognition performance
We observed signiﬁcant recognition (subjects selected the targets in a proportion greater than
chance), with medium-sized eﬀects for Target/Distractor (t (13) = 1.807, p < .05, d = .48), and
for T Target+/Distractor+ (t (13) = 1.847, p < .05, d = .49), and a large eﬀect for Target+/Dis-
tractor (t (13) = 4.618, p < .001, d = 1.23). These three conditions were not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
(p > .1). However, as with the mere exposure eﬀect, we observed a particularly large recognition
eﬀect size for Target+/Distractor pairs. Moreover, we observed no signiﬁcant recognition for
the Target/Distractor+ condition (t (13) = 1.370, p > .1, d = .36).
2.2.3. Remember, Know, and Guess responses
Table 2 presents the proportions of selected targets that were assigned Remember, Know, and
Guess (RKG) responses for the four contrast conditions.
Separate ANOVAs with contrast condition as within-subject variable were performed for each
response type. Regarding responses for targets (hits), there was a marginally signiﬁcant contrast
eﬀect (F (3, 39) = 2.773, p = .054) on R responses. This eﬀect showed an advantage for Target+/
Distractor pairs in comparison to other pairs (ps < .05). A similar contrast eﬀect was found for
K responses (F (3, 39) = 4.624, p = .007), with more K responses for Target+/Distractor pairs
than for Target/Distractor+ pairs (p < .001). Jacoby, Yonelinas, and Jennings (1997) have sug-
gested that, if recollection and familiarity are independent processes that operate in parallel, the
contribution of familiarity to recognition is underestimated by the proportion of K (familiar)
responses. When familiarity was measured by their Independence Remember/Know (IRK) proce-
dure (Familiarity = proportion of K responses/1  proportion of R responses), the analyses re-
vealed similar contrast eﬀects (F (3, 39) = 4.268, p = .01), with greater familiarity for Target+/
Distractor pairs than all other pairs (Target/Distractor+, F (3, 39) = 9.607, p = .008; Tar-
get+/Distractor+, F (3, 39) = 3.482, p = .08; target/Distractor, F (3, 39) = 6.566, p = .02).
Thus, the greater recognition eﬀect size for Target+/Distractor pairs observed for recognition
performance can be explained by both R responses (recollection-based recognition) and K
responses (familiarity-based recognition).
Finally, there were no signiﬁcant eﬀects on G responses (p > .05). Analyses did not reveal any
signiﬁcant eﬀect of contrast on distractors that were falsely recognized and classiﬁed as RKG
responses (ps > .05).Table 2
Proportions of Remember–Know–Guess responses for targets as a function of the four contrast conditions in
Experiment 1
Distractors  Distractors +
Targets  Targets + Targets  Targets +
Remember .25 (.09) .35 (.15) .29 (.10) .22 (.17)
Know .26 (.12) .34 (.10) .17 (.13) .28 (.11)
Guess .10 (.10) .09 (.09) .13 (.10) .11 (.13)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
332 S. Willems, M. Van der Linden / Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341In this ﬁrst experiment, we observed a great explicit preference for pairs where the target was
facilitated by both pre-exposure and high contrast. We observed a similar pattern of results for
recognition, with the same pairs being perceived as more familiar. In addition, when the distractor
was also made easy to process because it had a higher contrast than the target, the mere exposure
eﬀect disappeared and recognition performance declined.
Thus, an imperceptible manipulation of contrast at the test time seems to have an independent
and direct impact on preference judgment and familiarity-based recognition that can be added to
the pre-exposure eﬀect. Consequently, when there is an imperceptible diﬀerence in contrast be-
tween stimuli, participants seem not to construct expectations concerning the processing ease of
diﬀerent classes of stimuli. In this context, people seem to base their judgment on a direct assess-
ment of absolute ﬂuency.
In our second experiment, we examined whether a more perceptible, but still slight, diﬀer-
ence in the quality of stimuli during the preference judgment could produce an opposite eﬀect.
In other words, the question addressed in Experiment 2 was whether processing ﬂuency due to
pre-exposure was more likely to be used for judgments when picture quality would prompt
participants to expect to be able to process targets less eﬃciently relative to distractors (Tar-
get/Distractor+) than when subjects construct larger expectations about target ﬂuency (Tar-
get+/Distractor).3. Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined cases in which a more perceptible ﬁgure-ground contrast vari-
ation at the time of test might create expectations about the processing of high- and low-quality
stimuli. Contrast manipulation that favors the target, but not the distractor, may allow partici-
pants to formulate high expectations about target ﬂuency. Thus the enhancement of ﬂuency
due to pre-exposure might go unnoticed and thus be less likely to be used for judgments. Con-
versely, with a high-contrast distractor, actual target ﬂuency could be more important than the
ﬂuency normally expected when the target has a lower contrast than when it is as high contrast
as the distractor. This possible discrepancy between expected ﬂuency and actual ﬂuency should
result in an increase in positive judgment. So, while we observed a positive and direct impact




Twenty-four undergraduate students were volunteers in this experiment. There were 12 men
and 12 women. Their mean age was 23.7 years (SD = 2.6).
3.1.2. Materials and procedure
The experimental details were the same as in Experiment 1, with one exception: low-contrast
objects underwent a 20% contrast (contrary to 10% in Experiment 1). These picture modiﬁcations
were slight; thus, the decrease in contrast quality could be perceived without necessarily denoted.
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The means as a function of the four contrast conditions are presented in Table 1 for preference
and recognition. Again, as there was no eﬀect of the order of the tasks on preference and recog-
nition scores (ps > .1), we did not consider this variable in the following analyses.
3.2.1. Mere exposure eﬀect
We observed a signiﬁcant and large mere exposure eﬀect for Target/Distractor pairs
(t (23) = 4.271, p < .001, d = .89). Contrary to Experiment 1, we also found a medium eﬀect for
Target/Distractor+ pairs (t (23) = 2.303, p < .025, d = .48). For these Target/Distractor+
pairs, the ﬂuency advantage of target over distractor was probably slighter than for other pairs.
Nevertheless, if the enhanced ﬂuency due to a prior repeated global encoding (i.e., processing
facilitation through structural extraction induced by the orientation task; Schacter et al., 1990)
is greater than the perceptual ﬂuency due to the contrast level (i.e., processing facilitation through
very low-level perceptual processes), then a previously seen low-contrast target should be per-
ceived as slightly easier to process than a new high-contrast distractor. While this slight advantage
of absolute ﬂuency did not ensure to observe a mere exposure eﬀect in Experiment 1, given the
more perceptible quality diﬀerence in Experiment 2, this slight ﬂuency advantage could be more
surprising and thus more salient.
As expected, a visible high-contrast advantage for the target undermines the mere exposure
eﬀect (Target+/Distractor pairs: t (23) = 0.385, p > .1, d = .20). This result might suggest, on
one hand, that subjects expected a greater target ﬂuency advantage for these pairs and therefore
might have attributed their entire actual ﬂuency feeling to picture quality. On the other hand, con-
trast might be perceived as irrelevant in a preference judgment concerning a complex three-dimen-
sional shape. In this context, high-processing ﬂuency attributed to this irrelevant variable might be
judged as uninformative and thus would not give rise to a feeling of preference. Consequently,
subjects might turn to other inputs than ﬂuency to make their judgments.
Finally, and more surprisingly, we observe an absence of eﬀect for Target+/Distractor+ pairs
(t (23) = 1.317, p > .1, d = .27). Indeed, in terms of absolute ﬂuency, pre-exposure should induce a
ﬂuency advantage for the target over the distractor. In light of the attributional processes that
might moderate the impact of ﬂuency, subjects should not have formulated higher expectations
concerning target ﬂuency based on a comparison of the target and its distractor. However, given
that contrast seems to be perceived as irrelevant to judgment, we assumed that subjects might
have judged the ﬂuency to be an uninformative cue for all high-contrast ﬁgures. In fact, partici-
pants may have based their ﬂuency expectations on overall high- and low-quality pictures, rather
than on a comparison between the target and distractor in each pair.
3.2.2. Recognition performance
Subjects selected the targets in a proportion greater than chance in each condition (ps 6 .05),
with medium-sized eﬀects for Target/Distractor (t (23) = 2.352, p < .05, d = .49), and for Tar-
get/Distractor+ (t (23) = 2.826, p < .005, d = .59), a small eﬀect for Target+/Distractor
+(t (23) = 1.763, p < .05, d = .37), and the large eﬀect for Target+/Distractor (t (23) = 7.892,
p < .001, d = 1.64). An ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect for contrast (F (3, 69) = 4.401,
p = .006), with an advantage for Target+/Distractor pairs compared with other pairs (ps < .05).
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Table 3 shows the proportions of selected targets that were assigned R, K, and G responses for
the four contrast conditions.
Regarding the correct R responses, we observed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for contrast (F (3,
69) = 7.940, p < .001), indicating an advantage for the Target+/Distractor pairs compared with
other pairs (ps 6 .001), as in Experiment 1. This condition therefore seems to be an optimal con-
dition for eﬀective recollection-driven recognition. These pairs might constitute the easiest situa-
tion for recollection memory, because the target might completely match the memory trace (same
object associated with same contrast context), whereas the distractor might not match it at all (dif-
ferent object with diﬀerent context).
For correct K responses, we observed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect for contrast (F (3,69) = 5.794,
p = .001) indicating an advantage for the Target/Distractor+ and Target/Distractor pairs
compared with the other two kinds of pairs (ps 6 .001). When familiarity was measured by the
IRK procedure (Jacoby et al., 1997), the analyses conﬁrmed these results. Consequently, contrary
to Experiment 1, the better recognition performance for Target+/Distractor might be explained
only by R responses (recollection-based recognition). These ﬁndings were thus similar to those for
the mere exposure eﬀect.
Finally, there were no signiﬁcant eﬀects on G responses (p > .05). For distractors falsely recog-
nized and classiﬁed as RKG responses; as in Experiment 1, analyses did not reveal any signiﬁcant
eﬀect of contrast (ps > .05).
Thus, we observed in Experiment 2 that a perceptible quality manipulation during the prefer-
ence and recognition judgments has an inverse impact on preference as well as on familiarity-
based recognition. This is consistent with the ﬂuency–attribution account of the mere exposure
eﬀect and familiarity-based recognition described above, as well as the idea that the impact of
experienced ﬂuency on familiarity and explicit preference may be moderated by indirect factors
(e.g., Bornstein & DAgostino, 1994; Butler et al., 2004; Reber et al., 2004; Schwarz, 2004a;
Van den Bergh & Vrana, 1998). The greater diﬀerence between stimuli seems to allow participants
to construct expectations about the processing of high- and low-quality stimuli. In this context,
people seem not to make their judgment based on a direct assessment of ﬂuency per se, but rather
on the fact that the ﬂuent processing occurs under unexpected circumstances (see also Butler et al.,
2004). However, these attributional processes seem to be implicit. Indeed, no participant was able
to report on it and only three subjects pointed out the variation in contrast during the debrieﬁng.
Moreover, since pre-exposure did not inﬂuence the preference judgment on high-quality stim-
uli, it seems that once a subject detected any variable that might produce ﬂuency for the wrongTable 3
Proportions of Remember–Know–Guess responses for targets as a function of the four contrast conditions in
Experiment 2
Distractors  Distractors +
Targets  Targets + Targets  Targets +
Remember .32 (.21) .53 (.23) .28 (.23) .31 (.21)
Know .23 (.19) .11 (.14) .27 (.24) .13 (.13)
Guess .08 (.12) .16 (.16) .10 (.13) .16 (.17)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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detect the inﬂuence of this variable and develop indeﬁnite expectations from it but might not as-
sess the exact extent of its impact. In a third experiment, the question addressed was whether par-
ticipants become able to accurately estimate the eﬀect of contrast on their feelings of ﬂuency and
to develop clear expectations based on this factor when a more obvious diﬀerence in contrast
makes them really aware of a contrast that may result in ﬂuency.4. Experiment 3
In the third experiment, we directly tested the idea that a perceptible and obvious contrast dif-
ference at the test time could create expectation but with a more eﬃcient estimation of the con-
trast eﬀect. Indeed, subjects could more accurately assess the amount of ﬂuency resulting from
contrast by comparing the ﬂuency for a speciﬁc stimulus to that of other stimuli with the same
contrast level. In other words, the discrepancy between expected and actual ﬂuency of processing
may inﬂuence the preference judgment and the feeling of familiarity (as in Experiment 2) only
when the variable that prompts subjects expectations is subtle and tricky to assess. If this assump-
tion is correct, then it should be possible to make preference and familiarity similar for high- and
low-contrast stimuli by making the variation in contrast more obvious to subjects.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Subjects
Fourteen young adults were volunteers in this experiment. There were seven men and seven
women. Their mean age was 20.9 years (SD = 1.54).
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
The experimental details were the same as Experiment 1, with one exception: contrast variation
was 40% (compared to 10% in Experiment 1 and to 20% in Experiment 2). This variation was
marked and striking.
4.2. Results and discussion
The mean proportions of target objects selected in the recognition and preference tasks as a
function of the four contrast conditions are presented in Table 1. As was the case in Experiments
1 and 2 since there was no eﬀect of the order of the tasks on preference and recognition scores
(ps > .15), we did not consider this variable in the following analyses.
4.2.1. Mere exposure eﬀect
Subjects selected the targets in a proportion greater than chance for all pairs, with medium-
sized eﬀects (Target/Distractor, t (13) = 1.947, p < .05, d = .54; Target+/Distractor,
t (13) = 2.133, p < .05, d = .59; Target/Distractor+, t (13) = 2.135, p < .05, d = .59; Target+/
Distractor+, t (13) = 1.771, p = .05, d = .49). Thus, we observed a signiﬁcant mere exposure eﬀect
for each condition. Moreover, an ANOVA with contrast condition as within-subject variable did
Table 4
Proportions of Remember–Know–Guess responses for targets as a function of the four contrast conditions in
Experiment 3
Distractors  Distractors +
Targets  Targets + Targets  Targets +
Remember .34 (.24) .49 (.20) .31 (.23) .30 (.24)
Know .19 (.18) .19 (.18) .21 (.17) .20 (.19)
Guess .06 (.09) .11 (.13) .11 (.13) .10 (.10)
Notes. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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preference judgment disappeared when the contrast manipulation was striking.
4.2.2. Recognition performance
Subjects selected the targets in a proportion greater than chance in each condition (ps 6 .05).
An ANOVA revealed a marginally signiﬁcant contrast eﬀect (F (3, 39) = 2.492, p = .07). This ef-
fect indicated a slight advantage for Target+/Distractor pairs compared with other pairs
(ps < .07).
4.2.3. Remember, Know, and Guess
Regarding the correct R responses (see Table 4), we observed a marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect of
contrast (F (1, 13) = 2.470, p = .076), with Target+/Distractor pairs slightly superior to other
pairs (ps 6 .07).
No signiﬁcant eﬀect was observed for correct K and G responses (ps > .1). The absence of any
eﬀect of contrast on K was also observed with the IRK procedure (p = .27). Thus, the contrast
eﬀect on familiarity disappeared, just as it did with the preference judgment.
During the debrieﬁng following the experiment, subjects noted that the darkest ﬁgures were less
easy to process and that the preference judgment about Target+/Distractor or Target/Distrac-
tor+ pairs was more diﬃcult than with Target/Distractor and Target+/Distractor+ pairs. In
other words, when subjects become really aware of contrasts that may produce ﬂuency, they seem
to have more motivation and also to allocate more resources to accurately estimate the size of the
contrast eﬀect. These eﬀects highlight the importance of the ‘‘relativity’’ of ﬂuency. In fact, the
feeling of ﬂuency is experienced in comparison to the relative diﬃculty of the processing of other
items. It seems that awareness of the exact inﬂuence of contrast depends on the overall compar-
ison of stimuli within the same class. This comparison may allow participants to make accurate
forecasts concerning the processing ﬂuency norm for each type of stimuli. Awareness of the exact
contrast inﬂuence thus seems to ensure that participants will allocate the portion of ﬂuency that is
not explained by contrast (i.e., in fact, due to pre-exposure) to preference or familiarity.5. Conclusion
In these experiments, the inﬂuence of processing ﬂuency due to pre-exposure on preference and
recognition judgments was found to depend on the quality of the target and distractor items
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theless, the inﬂuence of stimulus quality on the prior exposure eﬀect was expressed in diﬀerent
ways depending on the subjects awareness of the inﬂuence of this variable on their own process-
ing experience. In Experiment 1, the inﬂuence of an imperceptible diﬀerence in stimulus quality
was direct. So, for a portion of the target–distractor pairs, the contrast advantage for targets
might make the ﬂuency feeling particularly strong, greater on average than for matched distrac-
tors or for other stimuli in the test phase. In that case, it is the speed and ease of processing result-
ing from both repeated exposure (see Jacoby & Dallas, 1981) and high-quality stimuli (e.g.,
Checkosky & Whitlock, 1973; Whittlesea et al., 1990) that inﬂuence peoples decision processes:
the absolute magnitude of ﬂuency resulting from the various sources can have a direct impact
on peoples preference and recognition decisions. These ﬁndings tally, on the one hand, with
the ﬂuency account of the mere exposure eﬀect (Bornstein & DAgostino, 1994; Jacoby et al.,
1989; Seamon et al., 1983a, 1983b; Whittlesea, 1993; Whittlesea & Price, 2001), and on the other
hand, with the well-established idea that ﬂuency may serve as a cue for various judgments (such as
recognition, through the familiarity feeling, e.g., Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Whittlesea et al., 1990).
In Experiment 2, with a more perceptible but still unnoticed quality diﬀerence at the time of
testing, the pre-exposure inﬂuence was particularly great when target stimuli were presented with
a low-quality level. In that case, it is the surprise related to the discrepancy between what is
expected of the type of stimulus and what actually happens in processing that sponsors the attri-
bution process moderating the role of ﬂuency in preference and recognition judgment (Whittlesea
& Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b). In other words, this experiment shows that people are able
to use the surprising ﬂuency when the quality of an event cannot be reconciled with the actual
feeling of ﬂuency (see Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). Conversely, when the diﬀerence in picture qual-
ity was really marked (Experiment 3), a similar pre-exposure eﬀect was noted for both high- and
low-quality stimuli. We therefore speculated that the expectation eﬀect in Experiment 2 occurred
because subjects developed an indeﬁnite expectation about the amount of ﬂuency related to the
two classes of stimuli.
In sum, these experiments suggested that when people are not able to distinguish between the
various sources of ﬂuency (e.g., indistinct quality picture), they can simply base their judgment on
the experienced ﬂuency amount. When people are able to distinguish a ﬂuency source (e.g., high-
quality level) and build up their expectations about how the diﬀerent classes of stimuli should be
processed, then the use of ﬂuency for their judgment may depend on the accuracy of their expec-
tations. With a subtle ﬂuency source, people may develop indeﬁnite expectations and attribute
their feeling of ﬂuency entirely to this source. In this case, they may turn to other cues than this
expected ﬂuency to make their judgments. With an obvious ﬂuency source, people may become
aware of the speciﬁc ﬂuency normally associated with the two stimuli types. In this case, they
may be perfectly able to detect ﬂuency that is not explained by this source and will attribute this
portion to familiarity or to the desirable nature of the stimulus.
This study, along with the results of several other recent studies (e.g., Butler et al., 2004; Whit-
tlesea & Leboe, 2003; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000, 2001a, 2001b; see also Westerman et al.,
2002), supports the notion that familiarity and preference are a function of the perceivers dynam-
ic attributional processes. That is, a stimulus may be perceived either as familiar and/or liked or as
unfamiliar and/or unliked depending on the expectations and interpretations of the perceiver
(Lloyd et al., 2003). The role of these attributional processes in the ﬂuency–aﬀect link has, at
338 S. Willems, M. Van der Linden / Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341present, received no attention. Future work should therefore assess more directly the contribution
of participants expectations in the mere exposure eﬀect. In line with Winkielman & Fazendeiros
work (unpublished, cited by Reber et al., 2004) that demonstrates that the inﬂuence of ﬂuency on
liking judgments is eliminated when subjects attribute their ﬁrst aﬀective reaction to an irrelevant
variable, instructional manipulation might conceivably address this issue.
Finally, theorists of aesthetics have long considered ﬁgure-ground contrast to be an ‘‘objective’’
determinant of beauty (see Reber et al., 2004). However, this study also supports the notion that
the ‘‘contrast as liking’’ factor resides in the subjective eye of the perceiver. In addition, Reber and
Schwarz (2001) showed that it is not the objective ﬁgure-contrast per se that is an attractive attri-
bute, rather it is the resulting perceptual ﬂuency which contributes to more positive evaluations.
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm this assumption. Moreover, while contrast seems to be judged pertinent by
subjects for their preference judgments concerning relatively simple ﬁgures (Reber et al., 1998; Re-
ber & Schwarz, 2001), it seems to be perceived non-essential and incidental for complex ﬁgures
that are richer in visual features (three-dimensional objects). Further, this study shows that,
depending on their awareness of the inﬂuence of contrast on ﬂuency, perceivers will attribute
the ﬂuency due to contrast to either the familiarity or the desirable attributes of a stimulus (result-
ing in more positive judgments), or to their own processing experience related to this irrelevant
source (undermining or reducing the inﬂuence of ﬂuency on judgments).Appendix A. Remember–Know–Guess instructions
A.1. Remember
Often, when you recognize a ﬁgure, you remember that you have seen it before and you remem-
ber the precise context you have seen in it. You may also remember an event, a feeling or a
thought that occurred when you ﬁrst saw this ﬁgure. For example, when you saw that ﬁgure
for the ﬁrst time, you found that it looked like building, spaceship, etc. or you noticed a particular
feature. So we ask you to classify as ‘‘remember’’ a response for which you can retrieve informa-
tion about the encoding context.
A.2. Know
We ask you to classify a response as ‘‘know’’ if you do not remember any information associ-
ated with the ﬁgure. You are sure that you have seen it before because you have a strong feeling of
familiarity, but you do not remember any information encoded with the ﬁgure, such as when you
saw it or any element that you might have noticed.
A.3. Guess
You can guess if you do not remember any of the ﬁgures. If none of the ﬁgures seem familiar or
if you do not remember any information about the learning context for any of them, you cannot
respond that you ‘‘remember’’ or ‘‘know.’’ Because you still have to choose one ﬁgure, you can
guess.
S. Willems, M. Van der Linden / Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341 339References
Berlyne, D. E., & Crozier, J. B. (1971). Eﬀects of complexity and prechoice stimulation on exploratory choice.
Perception and Psychophysics, 10, 242–246.
Bornstein, R. F. (1989). Exposure and aﬀect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968–1987. Psychological
Bulletin, 106, 265–289.
Bornstein, F. R., & DAgostino, P. R. (1992). Stimuli recognition and the mere exposure eﬀect. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology, 4, 545–552.
Bornstein, R. F., & DAgostino, P. R. (1994). The attribution and discounting of perceptual ﬂuency: Preliminary tests
of a perceptual ﬂuency/attributional model of the mere exposure eﬀect. Social Cognition, 12, 103–128.
Bornstein, R. F., Kale, A. R., & Cornell, K. R. (1990). Boredom as a limiting condition on the mere exposure eﬀect.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 791–800.
Butler, L. T., Berry, D., & Helman, S. (2004). Dissociating mere exposure and repetition priming as a function of word
type. Memory and Cognition, 5, 759–767.
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Losch, M. E., & Kim, H. S. (1986). Electromyographic activity over facial muscle regions
can diﬀerentiate the valence and intensity of aﬀective reactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50,
260–268.
Carrasco, M., & Seamon, J. G. (1996). Priming impossible ﬁgures in the object decision test: The critical importance of
perceived stimulus complexity. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 3, 344–351.
Checkosky, S. F., & Whitlock, D. (1973). Eﬀects of pattern goodness on recognition time in a memory search task.
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 100, 341–348.
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum
Associates.
Cox, D. S., & Cox, A. D. (1988). What does familiarity breed? Complexity as a moderator of repetition eﬀects in
advertisement evaluation. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 111–116.
Cox, D. S., & Cox, A. D. (2002). Beyond ﬁrst impressions: The eﬀects of repeated exposure on consumer liking of
visually complex and simple product designs. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 30, 119–130.
Fenske, M. J., Raymond, J. E., & Kunar, M. A. (2004). The aﬀective consequences of visual attention in preview search.
Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 11, 1055–1061.
Gardiner, J. M. (1988). Functional aspects of recollective experience. Memory and Cognition, 16, 309–313.
Harmon Jones, E., & Allen, J. J. B. (2001). The role of aﬀect in the mere exposure eﬀect: Evidence from
psychophysiological and individual diﬀerences approaches. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 889–898.
Harrison, A. A. (1977). Mere exposure. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 10,
pp. 39–83). New York: Academic Press.
Jacoby, L. R., & Dallas, M. (1981). On the relationship between autobiographical memory and perceptual learning.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 3, 306–340.
Jacoby, L. L., Kelley, C. M., & Dywan, J. (1989). Memory attributions. In F. I. M. Craik & H. L. Roediger (Eds.),
Varieties of memory and consciousness: Essays in honour of Endel Tulving (pp. 391–422). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Jacoby, L. L., & Whitehouse, K. (1989). An illusion of memory: False recognition inﬂuenced by unconscious
perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 118, 126–135.
Jacoby, L. L., Yonelinas, A. P., & Jennings, J. M. (1997). The relation between conscious and unconscious (automatic)
inﬂuences: A declaration of independence. In J. W. Schooler & J. D. Cohen (Eds.), Scientiﬁc approaches to
consciousness (pp. 13–47). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Kelley, C. M., & Jacoby, L. L. (1998). Subjective reports and process dissociation: Fluency, knowing, and feeling. Acta
Psychologica, 98, 127–140.
Kelley, C. M., & Rhodes, M. G. (2002). Making sense and nonsense of experience: Attributions in memory and
judgment. In B. H. Ross (Ed.). The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and theory (Vol. 41,
pp. 293–320). San Diego, CA, USA: Academic Press.
Lloyd, M. E., Westerman, D. L., & Miller, J. K. (2003). The ﬂuency heuristic in recognition memory: The eﬀect of
repetition. Journal of Memory and Language, 48, 603–614.
340 S. Willems, M. Van der Linden / Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341Rajaram, S. (1993). Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past. Memory and Cognition, 21,
89–102.
Rajaram, S., & Geraci, L. (2000). Conceptual ﬂuency selectively inﬂuences knowing. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1070–1074.
Reber, R., & Schwarz, N. (2001). The hot fringes of consciousness: Perceptual ﬂuency and aﬀect. Consciousness and
Emotion, 2, 223–231.
Reber, R., Schwarz, N., & Winkielman, P. (2004). Processing ﬂuency and aesthetic pleasure: Is beauty in the perceivers
processing experience? Personality and Social Psychological Review, 8, 364–382.
Reber, R., Winkielman, P., & Schwarz, N. (1998). Eﬀects of perceptual ﬂuency on aﬀective judgments. Psychological
Science, 9, 45–48.
Schacter, D. L., Cooper, L. A., & Delaney, S. M. (1990). Implicit memory for unfamiliar objects depends on access to
structural descriptions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 119, 5–24.
Schwarz, N. (2004a). Metacognitive experiences in consumer judgment and decision making. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 14, 332–348.
Schwarz, N. (2004b). Metacognitive experiences: Response to commentaries. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 14,
370–373.
Seamon, J. G., Brody, N., & Kauﬀ, D. M. (1983a). Aﬀective discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized: Eﬀects of
shadowing, masking, and cerebral laterality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
9, 544–555.
Seamon, J. G., Brody, N., & Kauﬀ, D. M. (1983b). Aﬀective discrimination of stimuli that are not recognized II: Eﬀects
of delay between study and test. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 21, 187–189.
Seamon, J. G., Ganor Stern, D., Crowley, M. J., Wilson, S. M., Weber, W. J., ORourke, C. M., et al. (1997). A mere
exposure eﬀect for transformed three-dimensional objects: Eﬀects of reﬂection, size, or color changes on aﬀect and
recognition. Memory and Cognition, 25, 367–374.
Seamon, J. G., Williams, P. C., Crowley, M. J., Kim, I. J., Langer, S. A., Orne, P. J., et al. (1995). The mere exposure
eﬀect is based on implicit memory: Eﬀect of stimulus type, encoding conditions, and number of exposures on
recognition and aﬀect judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21,
711–721.
Tulving, E. (1985). Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology, 26, 1–12.
Van den Bergh, O., & Vrana, S. R. (1998). Repetition and boredom in a perceptual ﬂuency/attributional model of
aﬀective judgments. Cognition and Emotion, 12, 533–553.
Westerman, D. L. (2001). The role of familiarity in item recognition, associative recognition, and plurality
recognition on self-paced and speeded tests. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 27, 723–732.
Westerman, D. L., Lloyd, M. E., & Miller, J. K. (2002). The attribution of perceptual ﬂuency in recognition memory:
The role of expectation. Journal of Memory and Language, 47, 607–617.
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1993). Illusions of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition, 19, 1235–1253.
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (2003). On the construction of behavior and subjective experience: The production and evaluation
of performance. In C. J. Marsolek & J. S. Bowers (Eds.), Rethinking implicit memory (pp. 239–260). London: Oxford
University Press.
Whittlesea, B. W., Jacoby, L. L., & Girard, K. (1990). Illusions of immediate memory: Evidence of an attributional
basis for feelings of familiarity and perceptual quality. Journal of Memory and Language, 29, 716–732.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Leboe, J. P. (2003). Two ﬂuency heuristics (and how to tell them apart). Journal of Memory and
Language, 49, 62–79.
Whittlesea, B. W., & Price, J. R. (2001). Implicit/explicit memory versus analytic/nonanalytic processing: Rethinking
the mere exposure eﬀect. Memory and Cognition, 29, 234–246.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (1998). Why do strangers feel familiar, but friends dont? A discrepancy-
attribution account of feelings of familiarity. Acta Psychologica, 98, 141–165.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2000). The source of feelings of familiarity: The discrepancy-attribution
hypothesis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 547–565.
S. Willems, M. Van der Linden / Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2006) 323–341 341Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2001a). The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: I. The heuristic basis of
feelings and familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27, 3–13.
Whittlesea, B. W. A., & Williams, L. D. (2001b). The discrepancy-attribution hypothesis: II. Expectation, uncertainty,
surprise, and feelings of familiarity. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 27,
14–33.
Williams, P., & Tarr, M. J. (1997). Structural processing and implicit memory for possible and impossible ﬁgures.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 23, 1344–1361.
Winkielman, P., & Cacioppo, J. T. (2001). Mind at ease puts a smile on the face: Psychophysiological evidence that
processing facilitation elicits positive aﬀect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 989–1000.
Winkielman, P., & Fazendeiro, T. A. (2003). The role of conceptual ﬂuency in preference and memory. Unpublished
manuscript.
Winkielman, P., Schwarz, N., Fazendeiro, T. A., & Reber, R. (2003). The hedonic marking of processing ﬂuency:
Implications for evaluative judgment. In K. C. Klauer & J. Musch (Eds.), The psychology of evaluation: Aﬀective
processes in cognition and emotion (pp. 189–217). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Zajonc, R. B. (1968). Attitudinal eﬀects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Monograph
Supplement, 9, 1–27.
